\section{Introduction}
Our project considers the \emph{asynchronous verifiable secret sharing} scheme of
Zhou et al. \cite{Zhou:2005:APS:1085126.1085127}. Specifically, the original work
considers a set of $n \geq 3t+1$ servers that hold \emph{shares} of a secret $s$. Any
standard $(n, t+1)$ secret sharing scheme allows $t+1$ shares to recover the secret, 
while preventing any $t$ or fewer shares from yielding information about $s$.\\ \indent
The original work considers a \emph{mobile}, rather than static, adversary. That is,
the adversary \emph{dynamically} corrupts a set of servers, which may recover after
a given time period has passed. The goal is to provide security against adversaries
that can corrupt at most $t$ servers in a given time period.\\ \indent
This is accomplished by performing periodic \emph{share refreshing}, where the
current shares are transformed into a new set of shares. This process prevents an
adversary from obtaining $t$ shares in round $i$, and then using any share from
round $i+1$ to reconstruct the secret.

The following section provides a high level overview of the original verifiable secret 
sharing scheme \cite{Zhou:2005:APS:1085126.1085127}. Next we state our 
contributions in this project where we describe the limitations we identified 
and summarize our implementation. The details of the design and implementation 
is discussed in Section \ref{impl} followed by details of experiments in 
Section \ref{exp}.
